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ABSTRACT 
In a recent paper published in this Review, Gilbert and 
Newbery (1982) show that, because an incumbent firm enjoys greater 
marginal incentives to engage in R and D (under their assumption of 
deterministic invention), the incumbent firm will engage in preemptive 
patenting. Thus the industry will tend to remain monopolized, and by 
the same firm. They then argue heuristically that this result extends 
to the case in which innovation is uncertain. One form of this 
conjecture is that the incumbent patents the innovation more often 
than not. We briefly review the Gilbert and Newbery argument as well 
as those in related papers (Gilbert, 1981 and Craswell, 1981). We 
then present a model which incorporates uncertainty and concludes the 
contrary; that is, in a Nash equilibrium the incumbent firm invests 
less on the innovation than a challenger. Consequently, the incumbent 
firm will patent the innovation less often than not. This result 
indicates that one need worry far less about persistent monopoly than 
would be suggested by the Gilbert and Newbery analysis. 
UNCERTAIN HINOVATION AND THE PERSISTENt'E OF MONOPOLY 
Jennifer F, Reinganum1 
I. Introduction 
In a recent paper published in this Review, Gilbert and 
Newbery (1982) show that, because an incumbent firm enjoys greater 
marginal incentives to engage in R and D (under their assumption of 
deterministic invention), the incumbent firm will engage in preemptive 
patenting. Thus the industry will tend to remain monopolized, and by 
the same firm. They then argue heuristically that this result extends 
to the case in which innovation is uncertain. That is, they argue 
that the incumbent firm will patent the innovation first because it 
can act so as to ' 'guarantee' '  that a rival firm will make negative 
profits (that it should wish to do so is taken for granted). However, 
we will also consider the weaker claim that the result is 
stochastically true; that is, that the incumbent firm will patent the 
innovation more often than not, The paper cited above and a related 
paper by Gilbert (1981) suggest two alternative ways to formalize this 
conjecture. The first is: an incumbent firm will invest more than a 
challenger on a particular project. The second is: an incumbent firm 
will run more parallel projects than a challenger, In Section II we 
briefly review the Gilbert and Newbery argument as well as those in 
I would like to thank Ed Green and John Roberts for helpful comments. 
The financial support of the National Science Foundation is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
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related papers (Gilbert, 1 981 and Craswell, 1981), In Section III we 
present a model which incorporates uncertainty and at least partially 
controverts the first statement; that is, in a Nash equilibrium the 
incumbent firm invests less on a given project than a challenger. 
Consequently, the incumbent firm will patent the innovation less often 
than not, Section IV presents a simple model which examines the 
second form of the conjecture in a rigorous framework, We conclude 
that for a nontrivial set of innovati?ns, in a Nash equilibrium an 
incumbent firm will choose to conduct fewer parallel projects than a 
challenger. Hence again the incumbent will patent the innovation less 
often than not, These results indicate that one need worry far l�ss 
about persistent monopoly than would be suggested by the Gilbert and 
Newbery analysis. 
The intuition for these results is relatively straightforward, 
at least in the case where the first successful innovator captures the 
entire post-innovation market, When the inventive process is 
stochastic, the incumbent firm continues to receive flow profits 
during the time preceding innovation. This period is of random length 
but is stochastically shorter the greater the firms ' investments in R 
and D. Since a successful incumbent merely ' 'replaces himself' ' 
(albeit with a more profitable product), the incumbent firm has a 
lower marginal incentive to invest in R and D than does the 
challenger. The substance of our argument is that this intuition 
holds true even for innovations which have less dramatic consequences 
for the post-innovation market. 
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II. Review of the Certainty Model 
For simplicity, consider a case of cost-reducing innovation in 
an industry with constant returns to scale. Let c denote the 
incumbent firm's initial unit cost, and let c be the unit cost 
associated with the new technology. The case in which preemptive 
patenting is relevant is c < c. Let the relevant profit rates be 
R -- the current revenue flow to the incumbent firm 
Tf (c) � the present value of monopoly profits using the new 
technology; also the present value of profits to the current incumbent 
if the incumbent receives a patent on the new technology 
n1 (c) � the present value of Nash-Cournot profits to the current 
incumbent firm if the challenger receives a patent on the new 
technology 
the present value of Nash-Cournot profits to the 
challenger if the challenger receives a patent on the new technology 
Note that since c < c, the present value of monopoly profits 
after innovation Tf (c) always exceeds the present value of monopoly 
profits before innovation R/r, 
Assumption 1. The functions Tf (c) , n1 (c) and nc (c) are continuous, 
and piecewise continuously differentiable, Moreover, lT (c) and nC (c) 
are nonincreasing in o while n1 (c) is nondecreasing in c, 
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That is, if the incumbent patents the new technology, its 
profits will be lower the higher is the unit cost associated with the 
new technology. On the other hand, if the challenger patents the new 
technology (and the incumbent continues to use the old one) , then the 
challenger's profits will be lower and the incumbent's higher the 
higher is the unit cost associated with the new technology. 
Definition 1. The innovation will be termed drastic if c i c
0, 
where 
c0 is assumed to exist and to be uniquely defined as the maximum value 
of c such that n1 (c) = O.
The important thing about the constant returns to scale 
assumption is that if profits are zero, so is output. Thus if c i c0 
then the current incumbent's output will be zero after the challenger 
patents the innovation. In this event, the challenger is a monopolist 
and nc (c) = lT<c) . Note that Tf (c) L n1 (c) + nc (c) with strict 
inequality whenever the innovation is not drastic. 
The following example illustrates the preceding discussion and 
Assumption l, If the demand curve is linear, P 
rr 2 2 functions above are (c) = (a - c) /4b , n1 (c) 
a - bQ, then the 
(a - 2; + c) 2/9b2 
and nC (c) = (a - 2c + -;;°)
2/9b2, whenever the expressions in parentheses 
are nonnegative; otherwise the relevant value for the function is 
zero, Each of these functions is continuously differentiable except 
at the point at which the expression in parentheses becomes zero, and 
continuity is preserved at that point, The innovation is drastic 
whenever c i c0, 
where a - 2c + c0 
= O. From this equality, it is 
easy to see that lT<c ) = nc(c ) and nI(c ) = o. 0 0 0 
The Gilbert-Newbery argument proceeds as follows. If the 
inventive process is deterministic, then whoever is willing to bid 
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most for the new technology receives the patent first with probability 
1. The challenger will be willing to bid up to nC(c), while the 
incumbent will be willing to bid up to lTCc) - nI(c), Since 
lTCcl L nI(cl + nc<cl, with strict inequality for c c0, the 
incumbent preemptively patents the new technology. Only if the 
innovation is drastic will the incumbent and the challenger invest an 
equal amount, Consequently, preemption is the Nash equilibrium 
outcome in the bidding game. Thus Gilbert and Newbery conclude that 
the industry will remain monopolized and in the hands of the current 
incumbent. 
This is clearly true when there is no uncertainty in the 
innovation process. However, Gilbert (1981, p. 229) subsequently 
argues: "Uncertainty the invention process does not greatly change 
the deterministic analysis of preemption, provided R and D 
expenditures are sensitive to the expected returns and the established 
firm is no more averse to risk than rivals. '' 
In a laudatory comment on the Gilbert paper, Craswell (1981, 
p. 272) continues: "Assuming any form of direct relationship between 
the amount spent on R and D and the likelihood of making the invention 
first, the incumbent will end up with the patent more often than not, 
and his monopoly will be maintained, In fact, the incumbent will 
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usually end up with the patent even if he is less efficient at R and D 
than are his rivals, so long as his inefficiency does not completely 
negate the advantage due to his larger expenditure on R and D. '' 
To summarize, Gilbert and Craswell evidently believe that the 
result that the incumbent invests more than the challenger extends 
straightforwardly to the case of uncertainty. In the next section, a 
simple model is presented which incorporates uncertainty. We come to 
quite the opposite conclusion regarding the persistence of monopoly: 
for an open set of technologies, the incumbent firm will, in a Nash 
equilibrium, invest less than a challenger. More precisely, for 
drastic innovations the incumbent always invests less than the 
challenger, so that the incumbency changes hands more often than not, 
contrary to Craswell's assertion. Due to the continuity of the 
equilibrium investment rates in the unit cost associated with the new 
technology, there will be an open neighborhood of c0, representing 
innovations which are not drastic, for which the incumbent still 
invests less than the challenger, 
A somewhat different argument is offered by Gilbert and 
Newbery (1982, p. 521) in support of the same basic claim. ''Similar 
results are obtained when the assumption of a deterministic patent 
date is replaced by a more general stochastic function which describes 
the probability of invention at date T conditional on a particular R 
and D plan. The argument is the same as before, except that the 
monopolist has to set up the correct number of rival research teams. '' 
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Thus the implied claim is that, if allowed to select the 
number of parallel projects to be undertaken, an incumbent firm would 
choose a larger number than would a challenger. Section IV presents a 
simple model with parallel projects. Again there is a nontrivial set 
of innovations which the the incumbent is less likely to patent than 
is the challenger. 
III. A Model Incorporating Uncertainty
The model developed in this section is a generalization of 
that of Lee and Wilde (1980) (which is itself based upon a model by 
Loury (1979)), and a specialization of that of Reinganum (1982), 
Again an incumbent and a challenger are simultaneously attempting to 
perfect a particular cost-reducing technology. Technological 
uncertainty takes the form of a stochastic relationship between the 
rate of investment and the eventual date of successful completion of 
the new technology. If xI represents the rate of investment of the 
incumbent and �I(xI) the random success date of the incumbent, then 
-h(xI) t 
Pr{�I(xI) i t}= 1 - e , for t a [O,.,,). Similarly, if xC and 
�c<xc) represent the investment rate and the random success date for
-h(xc)t the challenger, then Pr{�c<xc) i t} = 1 - e , The expected 
success date for firm i (i = I,C) is 1/h(xi)' where the function h(·) 
is the hazard function used in much of the recent literature on patent 
races. In particular, following Loury (1979), Lee and Wilde (1980) 
and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), we assume: 
!l 
i�s�umption 2. TI1e hazard function h(•) is nonnegative and increasing, 
( i) h(O) = 0 lim h' (x), 
x -> "' 
(ii) h1 I {x) 2.. Ci) 0 as x i (2) x < "' and 
(iii) h(x)/x 2.. (i) h' (x) as x 2.. (i) i' "'• 
Thus there may be initial increasing returns, but eventually the 
te chnology exhibits decreasing returns to scale. A typical hazard 
function is illustrated in Figure l, 
h L· ) 
rv 
x 
Figure 1 
Suppose that the new technology is patentable so that the race 
ends with the first success, The expected profit to the incumbent for 
any pair of investment rates (xI,xC) is 
That is, the incumbent receives TTCc) at t if the challenger has not 
yet succeeded and the incumbent succeeds at t; this event has 
probability density h(xI)e 
-(h(xI) + h(xe>>t The incumbent receives 
nI(c) at t if the incumbent has not yet succeeded and the challenger 
succeeds at t; this event has probability density 
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-(h(xI) + h(xe>>t h(xe)e Finally, the incumbent receives flow profits 
of R and pays flow costs of xI so long as no firm has succeeded; this 
-(h(xI) + h(xe>>t event has probability e 
The challenger's payoff is analogous, 
The differences between these payoffs arise from the 
incumbent's current profit flow and the fact that it shares the market 
in the event of successful innovation by the challenger, 
Definition 2, A strategy for the incumbent (challenger) is an 
investment rate xI (xe>• The 11.!YQ!f to the incumbent (challenger) is 
I e V (xI,xe) (V (xI,xe)), 
Definition 3 ,  A best response function for the incumbent is a 
function 6I:[O,m) -) [0,oo) such that, for each xe• 
I I V (6I(xe),xe) L V (xI,xe) for all xI e [0,m), Similarly, a best 
response function for the challenger is a function 6e:[O,m) -) [0,m) 
10 
e e such that, for each xI' V (xI,6e(xI)) L V (xI,xe) for all xe e [O,m), 
The best response functions will also depend upon the parameters 
(c,R). 
• • Definition 4. A strategy pair (xI,xe) is a Nash equilibrium if 
• • • • 
xI = 6I(xe) and xe = 6e<xI). That is, each firm's investment rate is 
a best response to the other's, 
The proof of the following Proposition can be found in the 
Appendix, 
Proposition 1, If h'(O) L max{ l/[lT(c) - R/r), l/ne (c)}, then there 
exists a best response function for the incumbent 6I(xe; c,R) which 
I satisfies the first-order condition av (6I,xe)/axI = 0 and the 
second-order condition a2vI<6I,xe)/ax� < O. The function 6I is 
continuously differentiable in its argument xe and continuous in the 
parameters c,R, Similarly, there exists a best response function for 
the challenger 6e (xI; c) which satisfies the analogous first- and 
second-order conditions, and is continuously differentiable in its 
argument xI and continuous in the parameter c, Moreover, there exists 
• • a pair of Nash equilibrium strategies xI(c,R) and xe(c,R); each is 
continuous in the parameters c,R. 
The first-order conditions which implicitly define the best 
response functions are 
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and 
c av (x1,6c)/axC = [r + h(x1) + h(oc)][h'(�c)nc(c) - l]
- C h<oc>nc<c> - 6clh'<oc> = o. ( 2) 
I Rearranging terms and noting the definitions of V (o1,xC) and 
and 
Remark 1. Since the individual firm payoffs must be nonnegative, 
particularly when the firms play best responses, it follows that 
Proof. By the implicit function theorem, 
(3) 
(4) 
The denominator is negative by the second-order condition, while the 
numerator is -h'(x1)[h'(oc>nc(c) - l], which is nonpositive by Remark 
1. 
Proposition 3 ,  If the innovation is drastic and R > 0, then 
Q.E.D. 
1 2  
61(x;c,R) < �C(x;c) for all x,c.
Proof, Recall that if the innovation is drastic, nc(c) = TT<c) and 
n1(c) = o. Then the only difference between equations (1) and (2), 
which implicitly define the best response functions o1 and �C' is the 
term R, representing current profit flows to the incumbent firm. If R 
= 0, and the innovation is drastic, then �1(x;c,O) = 6c(x;c) for all 
x,c. Again using the implicit function theorem, we see that 
Since the denominator is negative and the numerator is Rh'(o1) which 
is positive, we have 61(x;c,R) < o1(x;c,0) = 6c(x;c) for all R > 0,
and all x,c. 
Q,E.D. 
Proposition 4. If the innovation is drastic and R > 0, then in a Nash 
equilibrium the incumbent invests less than the challenger; that is, 
• • 
Proof. Suppose, contrary to the theorem, that x1(c,R) 2.. xC(c,R), 
Then Propositions 2 and 3 and the definition of a Nash equilibrium 
• 
imply that xC(c,R) 
• 
x1(c,R). 
But this is a contradiction. 
O, E,D. 
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Proposition S. If R > 0, then there exists an open neighborhood of c
0 
(which may depend on R), denoted N(c0;R), such 
• 
that if the technology 
is not drastic, but c e N(c0;R), then x1(c,R)
Proof, This follows immediately from Proposition 4 and the continuity 
• • 
of the Nash equilibrium investment rates x1(c, R) and xC(c,R) in the 
parameter c, 
Q, E, D. 
Thus we have concluded that in a nontrivial set of 
circumstances � that is, for technologies in the set N(c0;R) � it is 
precisely the assumption of certainty versus uncertainty which is 
responsible for the discrepancy between our results and those of 
Gilbert and Newbery, Obviously, their conjecture regarding the extent 
of applicability of their result needs to be tempered somewhat, To 
see the economics of the issue, consider what happens in our model 
with drastic innovation if the incumbent were to consider investing a 
tiny bit less. It would suffer a slightly increased probability of 
losing the patent to the challenger and a slightly decreased chance of 
collecting the patent itself, but would spend a bit less and would 
receive the flow revenue R stochastically longer, The challenger, by 
investing a bit less, suffers a slightly increased probability of 
losing the patent to the incumbent and a slightly decreased 
probability of collecting the patent for itself; on the other hand, it 
spends a bit less. Since it does not collect any additional current 
revenue, its marginal benefits due to investing a bit less are lower 
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than those of the incumbent, and hence in equilibrium the challenger 
invests more than the incumbent. Consider the same question under the 
assumption of certainty. What happens in the certainty model if the 
incumbent were to consider investing a tiny bit less? If the 
incumbent still invests more than the challenger, then the incumbent 
collects revenues R with probability 1 and suffers no threat of losing 
the patent to the challenger. If the incumbent was investing less 
than the challenger, then further reductions have no impact on their 
profits. The only important case is when the incumbent considers 
reducing its investment from above that of the challenger to below 
that of the challenger. This results in the incumbent receiving R for 
an infinitesimally short additional time, and losing the 
noninfinitesimal difference between the present values of monopoly 
profits and Nash-Cournot prof its when the challenger patents the new 
technology. Consequently, the incumbent is always willing to invest 
more than the challenger when the innovation process is deterministic, 
As long as a Nash equilibrium exists and possesses the 
requisite continuity properties, the key step in our argument will be 
Proposition 3 ,  Therefore it is important to ask whether there exist 
values of c which will reverse the result of Proposition 3 .  That is, 
what happens to this result for less nearly drastic innovations? 
Proposition 6 ,  The best response functions �1(x;c, R) and �C(x;c) are 
nonincreasing in c. 
Proof, These functions are continuous in c; where Tf(c), nC(c) and
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n1(c) are continuously differentiable, 61(x;c,R) and 6c(x;c) are 
continuously differentiable in c, Then the implicit function theorem 
implies that 
The denominator is negative by the second-order condition, while the 
numerator is -h'(;1)[(r + h(x))Tf'(c) - h(x)n1•(c)] > O by Assumption 
1, Similarly, 
The denominator is again negative; the numerator is 
-h'(;C)[r + h(x)lnc'(c) > 0 by Assumption l, Continuity implies that 
61(x;c,R) and ;C(x;c) cannot increase at values of c at which they are 
not differentiable, 
Q.E.D. 
This Proposition suggests that both best response functions 
are shifted downward by less drastic innovations; the net effect, 
which is what we are interested in, remains ambiguous, If 
61Cx;c,R) - 6c(x;c) is nonincreasing in c, then the incumbent invests 
less than the challenger even for less drastic innovations. 
On the other hand, if this expression is increasing, then it may be 
that there are innovations for which Proposition 3 does not hold, and 
consequently, for which the incumbent will invest more than the 
challenger, 
IV. A Model With Parallel Projects 
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In this section, we present a model which allows the incumbent 
and challenger to select the number of parallel projects to undertake, 
denoted n1 and nC for incumbent and challenger, respectively. The 
conjecture is that the incumbent is more likely than the challenger to 
patent the innovation; that is, the incumbent will choose a larger 
number of projects, For simplicity, suppose that the scale of each 
project is fixed at x, where h(x)nc(c) - x > O, so that the challenger 
has at least an opportunity of positive profit, In addition, there is 
a fixed cost of F per project, 
Definition S. A strategy for the incumbent (challenger) is a number 
of parallel projects, n1 (nC), The� to the incumbent 
(challenger) is v1cn1,nc) (V
C(n1,nc)) as defined below, For 
simplicity, we treat the number of projects as real rather than 
integral, 
Definition 6. A best response function for the incumbent is a 
function �1: [0,m) -> [0,m) such that, for each nC, 
I I V <�1<nc),nC) L V Cn1,nC) for all n1 e [0,m), Similarly, a best 
response function for the challenger is a function �C:[O,m) 
-> [O,m) 
c c such that, for each n1, V (n1,�C(n1)) L V (n1,nC) for all nc e [0,
00), 
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Again these functions will also depend upon the parameters (c, R). 
Definition 7, 
• • 
A strategy pair Cn1,nC) is a Nash equilibrium if 
• • • • 
nl = q1Cnc) and nc = qC(n1). That is, each firm's number of projects 
constitutes a best response to that of the other firm, 
First note that preemption (even stochastic preemption) can 
only be an issue if the challenger would choose nC > O if the
incumbent ignored the challenger and acted as if it were unopposed; 
that is, if (q1(0), 0) is not a Nash equilibrium. (This is because 
q1(0) is the optimal number of projects for an unopposed incumbent). 
Otherwise, the incumbent would simply be behaving as an unopposed 
monopolist, and would not be taking any account of the challenger at 
all, and hence cannot be accused of preemptive behavior. A proof of 
the existence of a Nash equilibrium for this model can be constructed 
using the same methodology as the proof for the model of Section III. 
Since the existence proof is not of intrinsic interest, let us simply 
assume that a best response function exists for each agent; if it 
does, then it will be (at least) piecewise continuously differentiable 
in the rival's strategy and continuous in the parameters (c, R). Let 
us further assume that a Nash equilibrium exists, and that at the 
equilibrium point the best response functions are continuously 
differentiable and do not have inverse slopes of each other; in this 
• • 
case, the equilibrium strategies n1(c, R) and nC(c,R) will be 
continuous in the parameters (c, R) (see llestenes 1980, p. 22, Theorem 
7 . 1). 
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We have already determined that the challenger will choose a 
positive number of projects, by arguing above that (q1(0), 0) cannot be 
an equilibrium in any case of interest. Similarly, let us assume that 
the incumbent also chooses a positive number of projects, so that the 
equilibrium is interior. The following f irst-order conditions must 
hold simultaneously at a Nash equilibrium: 
and 
• • IT [r + n1h(x) + n�(x)][h(x) (c) - x]
[n;h(x)Tf(c) + ndi(x)nC(c) + R - n;x]h(x) 
• • 2 - F[r + n1h(x) + n�(x)] = 0, 
• 
[r + n1h(x) + 
• 
- [n�(x)nc(c) 
• 
- ncx]h(x) 
• • 2 
- F[r + n1h(x) + n�(x)] = o. 
Under the assumption that x is fixed, each firm varies its 
''scale'' by choosing the number of (statistically independent) 
(5) 
(6) 
projects. Given this, we need only determine whether the incumbent or 
the challenger will invest in more parallel projects. 
Proposition 7, If the innovation is drastic and R > 0, then 
Proof, If the innovation is drastic, then nc(c) Tf <c) and 
n1(c) = o. Then equations (5) and (6) imply 
or 
• • IT (nc - n1)[h(x) (c) - x] R, 
• 
Since h(x)IT(c) - x > 0, equation (7) requires that nc(c,R) 
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(7) 
Q,E. D, 
Proposition 8, If R > O, then there exists an open neighborhood of c0 
(which may depend on R), denoted N(c ;R), such 0 that if the technology
• 
is not drastic, but c e N(c0;R), then n1(c,R) 
Proof, This result follows immediately from Proposition 7 and the 
• • 
continuity of n1(c,R) and nC(c,R) in the parameter c.
Q.E.D. 
Thus the alternative form of the conjecture is also false for 
an open set of innovations. It fails for essentially the same reason 
as before; the incumbent has a lower marginal incentive to hasten the 
date of innovation, since it continues to receive the flow profit R 
until innovation, while the challenger does not. 
V. Conclusion 
It seems clear that the assumption of certainty in the 
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inventive process is not an innocuous one, particularly when one com-
vares the policy implications of these two models. The Gilbert and 
Newbery model suggests that one ought to be very worried about the 
development of entrenched monopolies via preemptive patenting. This 
study suggests that one can reasonably worry far less on this score • 
The addition of incumbent advantages of various sorts can restore the 
result that an incumbent invests more than a challenger, but the ini-
tial, inertial effect of incumbency is to reduce the likelihood of 
persistent monopoly. 
Of course, the models discussed in this paper also rely 
heavily upon simplifying assumptions. The assumption of constant 
returns to scale in the output production function is particularly 
useful, since it is allows us to use simple parametric expressions for 
the post-innovation profit functions, Taken together, this paper and 
that of Gilbert and Newbery (1982) indicate that the influence of 
current monopoly power on the persistence of monopoly is considerably 
more complicated than either paper taken alone might suggest. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1, 
Note that sgn av1-tax1 = sgn f1, Under the assumption that
h'(O) L max { 1/[Tf"(c) - R/r], 1/ne(c) }, we see that f1(0,xe) L 0 for 
min (x Li I h'(x) i min(l/n1(c), 1/lTT(c) - R/r] }}.
This value exists and is finite since lim h'(x) 
x -> "' 
0, Since 
afl/axl = h''(x1>CTT(c)r - R + h(xc)nl(c) + xi] 
is first positive, is zero at x and then is negative, the function v1 
is first increasing, eventually peaks and subsequently declines, 
Consequently, v1 is single-peaked and reaches its peak at or before 
'£1(c,R) for all xe, 
The value of x1 which provides the peak is 61<xc;c,R), the 
unique best response for the incumbent to Xe· Moreover, since v
1 is 
twice differentiable in (x1,xe) and continuous in (c,R), and since 
2 I 2 a V (�1.xe)/ax1 < 0, 61 is implicitly defined as a continuously
differentiable function of xe (and a continuous function of (c,R)) 
by the first-order condition av1tax1 o. A similar argument 
establishes the analogous result for 6e• Figure 2 illustrates this 
argument. 
y1 
Figure 2 
Define the composite function ro = 
61 O 6e: [O,x1(c,R)] -> [O,x1(c,R)] (holding c and R fixed). The
function ro(x;c,R) is continuously differentiable in x on a compact, 
convex and nonempty domain. Hence it has a fixed point x;(c,R) by 
• 
Brouwer's theorem. That is, there is a point x1(c,R) such that 
• • • 
ro(x1(c,R);c,R) - x1(c,R) = O. Under the assumption that x1(c,R) is 
not a critical point of ro(x;c,R) - x (that is, 
24 
• 
aw(x1(c,R);c,R)/ax I 1), there exists a neighborhood of c in which the 
• 
implicit function x1(.,R) is continuous (see Hestenes 1980, p. 22, 
• • • 
Theorem 7,1), Let xC(c,R) = 6e(x1(c,R);c), The strategies x1(c,R) 
• 
and xC(c,R) constitute a Nash equilibrium, and they are continuous in 
the parameter c, 
,Q,E, D. 
